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Mathematical models of intergroup conflicts
S. Panchev∗,∗∗, Nikolay K. Vitanov∗∗∗
Abstract
The human society today is far from perfection and conflicts be-
tween groups of humans are frequent events. One example for such
conflicts are armed intergroup conflicts. The collective behavior of
the large number of cooperating participants in these conflicts allows
us to describe the conflict on the basis of models containing only few
variables. In this paper we discuss several cases of conflicts without
use of weapons of non-conventional kind. In the ancient times the
Chinese writer Sun Tsu mentioned that the war is an art. We can
confirm that the conflict is an art but with much mathematics at the
background.
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1 Introduction
Today we are excited by the fast advance of the physics and applied mathe-
matics in the area of research of complex systems in Nature and society [1-8].
An important part of the ground for this success was created more than 60
years ago when L. F. Richardson and L. W. Lanchester, both famous British
scientists, were the first who rose and applied the idea for mathematical
modeling of arms races and military combats [9-12]. For many years the
research on wars and other military conflicts was concentrated in the mili-
tary universities and academies. In the last 20 years and especially after the
terrorist attack on 11th of September 2001 this research became actual for
many physicists and applied mathematicians too [13-15].
In this paper we shall follow the terminology used by Epstein [16] who
applied ecological models of Lotka - Volterra kind for description of combats.
Let us have two conflicting groups named the ”Red group” R and the ”Blue
group” B. A general form of model equations of an armed conflict between
these groups is
dB
dt
= F (B,R; b, r),
dR
dt
= G(B,R; b; r)(1)
1
where R(t) and B(t) are the numbers of armed members of the two groups;
b and r are the ”firing efectivenes” (technology level) of the groups; and F
and G are linear or nonlinear functions, depending on the character of the
conflict. Epstein [16] proposed the following class of models of the conflict
dR
dt
= −bBc1Rc2 , dB
dt
= −rRc3Bc4(2)
where c1,2,3,4 are real nonnegative coefficients. If these coefficients are con-
stants the models are called hard models. If the coefficients depend on the the
number of participants or on the parameters of the environment the models
are called soft ones.
Important characteristics of the model (2) is the casuality exchange ratio
or state equation (the ratio of eliminated members of the ”red” and ”blue”
groups). For (2) the ratio is
η =
dR
dB
=
b
r
Bλb
Rλr
(3)
where λb = c1− c4 and λr = c3− c2. The integral form of the above casuality
exchange ratio is
I(B,R) =
b
λb + 1
Bλb+1 − r
λr + 1
Rλr+1 = I0(B0, R0)(4)
where B0 and R0 are the numbers of the members of the two groups at the
beginning of the conflict (at t = 0).
For developing of intuition and decision skills it is of interest to know
R(t) and B(t) in closed form. Such analytical solutions are possible only
in small number of cases. Section 2 contains the solution of the system of
model equations for selected values of the parameters ci. Several concluding
remarks are summarized in section 3.
2 Analytically solvable models
2.1 The attrition and the square law of Lanchester
The linear model of Lanchester describes position conflicts such as the battles
for Somna and Verdune in 1916. The coefficients in (2) are c1 = c3 = 1,
c2 = c4 = 0. The equation of state is quadratic
bB2(t)− rR2(t) = bB20 − rR20 = κ0(5)
2
where κ0 can be positive, negative, or 0. For the case κ0 = 0 we obtain
B0 =
√
r
b
R0 and the solutions are
R(t) = R0e
−at, B(t) = B0e−at, a =
√
br(6)
Evidently R(∞) = B(∞) = 0 which means that after endless position conflict
the two groups are destroyed and no one of them wins. However the situation
changes if κ0 6= 0.
Let us first assume that κ0 > 0. From the state equation (5) B
2(t) =
1
b
(κ0 + rR
2(t)) and the solutions of the model system of equations are
R(t) =
c20 exp(−2at)− κ0
2
√
rc0 exp(−at) , B(t) =
c20 exp(−2at) + κ0
2
√
bc0 exp(−at)
(7)
where c0 =
√
rR0 +
√
κ0 + rR20 =
√
rR0 +
√
bB0. The obtained solutions
satisfy the initial conditions R(0) = R0, B(0) = B0. In addition at T0 =
1
2a
ln
(
c2
0
κ0
)
> 0 we obtain R(T0) = 0 and B(T0) =
√
κ0/b 6= 0. In other words
the Blue group will win the conflict if it lasts long enough. The Red group
commanders have to change the strategy if they want to escape the defeat.
If this does not happen after the time T0 from the beginning the Red group
will be completely destroyed - Fig. 1. We note again that this happens when
κ0 > 0, i.e., when
B0 >
√
r
b
R0(8)
The condition (8) (but with = instead of > ) for military combats is known
as the square law of Lanchester: to stalemate and adversay army two times
as numerous as yours, your army must be four times as effective. But in
this case our army will be also destroyed. Thus the correct statement of
the square law is as follows: to stalemate and adversay army two times as
numerous as yours, your army must be more than four times as effective. In
other words: in position war, in order to stop army that is n time larger than
yours your army has to be more than n2 technologically better (to have more
than n2 times larger firepower).
We now discuss the case κ0 = − | κ0 |< 0. The solutions of the model
equations are
R(t) =
c20 exp(−2at)+ | κ0 |
2
√
rc0 exp(−at) , B(t) =
c20 exp(−2at)− | κ0 |
2
√
bc0 exp(−at)
(9)
Now the Red group wins if T0 =
1
2a
ln
(
c2
0
|κ0|
)
> 0 i.e. when R(T0) =
√
| κ0/r,
B(T0) = 0.
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Figure 1: Illustration of solution (7). The conflict ends at finite time by
destruction of the Red group. Nevertheless the Blue group suffers heavy
losses.
2.2 The concentrated attack model
In this case the coefficients in the general model are c1 = c2 = c3 = c4 = 1
and the equation of state is
bB(t)− rR(t) = bB0 − rR0 = a0(10)
Epstein assumes that stalemate occurs when B(t) = R(t) = 0, i.e., when
rR0 = bB0. Let us discuss this in more details.
If a0 = 0 (Epstein case) then the solution of the model system of equations
is
R(t) =
R0
1 + rR0t
, B(t) =
B0
1 + rR0t
(11)
thus at R(∞)) = B(∞) = 0, none of the groups wins, the attack is stopped
but the two groups are completely destroyed. This of course is not of favor
for the group leaders. In order to consider more realistic scenarios we have
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Figure 2: Illustration of the solution (12).
to set a0 6= 0. In this case the solutions of the model equations are
R(t) =
a0
n0 exp(a0t)− r , B(t) =
a0
b−m0 exp(−a0t)(12)
where m0 = rR0/B0 and n0 = bB0/R0. Now the sign of a0 determines the
asymptotic behavior of the number of members of the two groups. If a0 > 0
then B(∞) = a0/b = B0 − (r/b)R0 and R(∞) = 0. Thus the Blue groups
wins and the results of the attack is that the Red group is defeated -Fig.2
Now let a0 = − | a0 |. Then
B(t) =
− | a0 |
b−m0 exp(| a0 | t) , R(t) =
| a0 |
r − n0 exp(− | a0 | t)(13)
In this case as winner from the attack scenario is the Red group as B(∞) = 0,
R(∞) =| a0 | /r = R0 − (b/r)B0.
Now let us discuss the following detail. Let us assume that at the be-
ginning of the attack the Blue group has more soldiers than the Red group:
B0 > R0 but the firepower of the Red group is larger: r > b. Then there
must be a moment T1 where the two groups will have equal number of armed
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Figure 3: Illustration of the solution (13)
members: R(T1) = B(T1). This moment T1 can be determined from the
equation of state (10)
(b− r)B(T1) = a0(14)
What is interesting that when T1 > 0 a solution exists only if a0 = − | a0 |< 0
and it is (see Fig.3)
T1 =
1
| a0 | ln
(
B0
R0
)
(15)
2.3 The ambush
For this case c1 = c2 = c3 = 1, c4 = 0. The equation of state is
bB2(t)− 2rR(t) = bB20 − 2rR0 = s0(16)
What is interesting here is that the large group does not win in any case.
Let for an example s0 = 0. Then the solutions of the model equations are
R(t) =
R0(
1 + 1
2
bB0t
)2 , B(t) = B0(
1 + 1
2
bB0t
)(17)
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which means that none wins (R(∞) = B(∞) = 0) and the groups are de-
stroyed. This of course is not acceptable for both sides.
More realistic are situations where s0 6= 0. Let first s0 > 0. The solution
of the model equations is
B(t) =
√
s0
b
1− E0 exp(−ω0t)
1 + E0 exp(−ω0t) , R(t) = −
2s0
r
E0 exp(−ω0t)
(1 + E0 exp(−ω0t))2(18)
where ω0 =
√
bs0 and E0 =
√
s0−
√
bB0√
s0+
√
bB0
< 0. Thus in the asymptotic case
B(∞) =
√
s0/b and R(∞) = 0, i.e. the Blue groups wins.
Quite interesting is the case s0 = − | s0 |< 0. In this case the solution of
the model system is
B(t) = B0
1−∆−1 tan(σ0t)
1 + ∆ tan(σ0t)
, R(t) = R0
1 + tan2(σ0t)
(1 + ∆ tan(σ0t))2
(19)
where σ0 =
1
2
√
b | s0 |, ∆ = B0
√
b/ | s0 |. In this case at T0 = 1σ0 arctan(∆)
we obtain B(T0) = 0, R(T0) =
|s0|
2r
6= 0. Thus at t = T0 this conflict ends.
Blue group is completely destroyed and the Red group wins.
2.4 Two cubic models
For these models c1 = c3 = 2, c2 = c4 = 1 and c1 = c3 = 1, c2 = c4 = 2.
Epstein [16] argues that the exponents ci in the general model (2) should be
kept in the interval [0, 1]. However there is no evidence to sustain such an
assertion. Here we investigate two models for which some of the exponents
ci equal 2.
Let first c1 = c3 = 2, c2 = c4 = 1. The model equations are
dR
dt
= −bB2R, dB
dt
= −rR2B(20)
The equation of state is
bB2(t)− rR2(t) = bB20 − rR20 = κ0 = const(21)
If κ0 = 0 then the equation of the state together with one of the model
equations yield
R(t) =
R0√
1 + 2rR20t
, B(t) =
B0√
1 + 2bB20t
(22)
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No one of the groups wins at t→∞. If κ0 > 0 we obtain
R(t) =
√
κ0 exp(−κ0t)√
γ0 − r exp(−2κ0t)
, B(t) =
1√
b
√
κ0 + rR2(t)(23)
where γ0 = (κ0 + rR
2
0)/R
2
0. Thus R(∞) = 0 and B(∞) =
√
κ0/b. If κ0 < 0
R(t) =
√
| κ0 |√
r + γ0 exp(−2 | κ0 | t)
, B(t) =
1√
b
√
rR2(t)− | κ0 |(24)
Thus R(∞) =
√
| κ0 | /r and B(∞) = 0.
Let now c1 = c3 = 1 and c2 = c4 = 2. The equilibrium condition (4)
becomes
B(t) = B0
[
R(t)
R0
]ǫ
, ǫ =
r
b
(25)
The final solution is
R(t) = R0
(
1 +
t
τ0
)− b
r+b
, B(t) = B0
(
1 +
t
τ0
)− r
r+b
(26)
where τ0 = 1/((r + b)R0B0) is a typical time of decay.
Let us form the ratio
B(t)
R(t)
=
B0
R0
(
1 +
t
τ0
) b−r
b+r
(27)
where b > r or b < r. Assuming B0 > R0 but r > b and letting B(T1) =
R(T1) we obtain
T1 = τ0
[(
B0
R0
)κ
− 1
]
κ =
r + b
r − b(28)
Thus B(t) < R(t) at t > T1. Nevertheless, both groups, fight to the end
(B(∞) = R(∞) = 0).
2.5 A model accounting for epidemic events
It is known from the history of the conflicts that epidemic events had fre-
quently occurred particularly in case of attrition and ambush conflicts. The
simplest way to account for this effect (removing of conflict participants be-
cause of sickness) is to modify the general model as follows
dB
dt
= F (B,R; b, r)−HB, HB = kBB, kB ≥ 0
dR
dt
= G(B,R; b, r)−HR, HR = kRR, kR ≥ 0(29)
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where kB and kR are coefficients of morbility (sick rate) removal. Generally
kB 6= kR.
We choose to demonstrate the effect of epidemics on the model (16) in
the form
dB
dt
= −rR; dR
dt
= −bBR − kR, k > 0(30)
Hence
bB2(t)− 2rR(t) + 2kB(t) = s˜0 = const(31)
where
s˜0 = bB
2
0 − 2rR0 + 2kB0(32)
s˜ = bB20 > 0 if kB0 = rR0(33)
s˜ = 2kB0 > 0 if bB
2
0 = 2rR0(34)
In the general case (32) the quantity s˜0 can be zero, positive or negative. For
an example if s˜0 = 0 the solution of the model system is
B(t) =
2ǫ0k exp(−kt)
1− ǫ0b exp(−kt) , R(t) =
2
r
ǫ0k
2 exp(−kt)
1− ǫ0b exp(−kt)2(35)
where
ǫ0 =
B0
2k + bB0
=
B20
2rR0
These solutions degenerate into (17) at k → 0.
3 Summary and conclusion
A class of mathematical models of armed conflicts (2) was investigated. The
purpose was to identify particular cases with exact simple solutions in analyt-
ical form B = B(t) and R = R(t), where B and R were the armies’ numbers.
It was found that these requirements were met by the linear (Lanchester’s)
model known from long ago in the form (5) as well as by several nonlinear
models described in this paper. These models demonstrate rich behavior in
the time.
The predictions of the discussed models fall in two groups
• No one of the two groups B and R wins after endless (t→∞) attrition
conflict- fighting to the finish (6), (26)
• one of the groups wins after limited in time or after an endless conflict
(see Table 1)
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dR
dt
= −bB −bBR −bBR −bB2R −bBR2
dB
dt
= −rR −rBR −rR −rR2B −rRB2
I0 = κ0 (. . .) a0 (. . .) s0 (. . .) κ0 (. . .), (. . .) Q0 (. . .)
I0 = 0 B(∞) = 0 B(∞) = 0 B(∞) = 0 B(∞) = 0 B(∞) = 0
R(∞) = 0 R(∞) = 0 R(∞) = 0 R(∞) = 0 R(∞) = 0
I0 > 0 B(T0) =
√
κ0/b B(∞) = a0/b B(∞) =
√
s0/b B(∞) =
√
κ0/b B(∞) = 0
R(T0) = 0 R(∞) = 0 R(∞) = 0 R(∞) = 0 R(∞) = 0
I0 < 0 R(T0) =
√
| κ0 | /r R(∞) =| a0 | /r R(T0) =| s0 | /(2r) R(∞) =
√
| κ0 | /r B(∞) = 0
B(T0) = 0 B(∞) = 0 B(T0) = 0 B(∞) = 0 B(∞) = 0
T0 T0 =
1
2a
ln
(
c2
0
κ0
)
> 0 T0 =∞ T0 = 1σ0 arctan(∆) T0 =∞ T0 =∞
c0 =
√
rR0 +
√
bB0 ∆ = B0
√
b/ | s0 |
Table 1: Summary of model predictions.
Both conflicting groups are defined by their initial numbers B0, R0 and re-
spective firing efectivenesses per shot. The character of the conflict is mod-
eled by the form of the functions F andG (1) which can be linear or nonlinear.
All models can be extended to account for occuring of epidemic events in the
fighting groups. The model (30) is an example.
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